In its 2015–16 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will revisit Florida's death penalty procedures in Hurst v. Florida.1 This time, however, the court will primarily focus on juries' roles in capital sentencing proceedings.
In May 1998, Timothy Lee Hurst allegedly murdered his assistant manager, Cynthia Lee Harrison, at the fast food restaurant where he worked and robbed the safe. Harrison was eventually found locked in a freezer bound with electrical tape. She had more than 60 stab wounds. Hurst was convicted of the crime and faced the death penalty. At his capital sentencing hearing, prosecutors presented evidence concerning two aggravating factors relevant to the crime: that he killed Harrison while committing a robbery and that the killing was especially "heinous, atrocious and cruel." A majority of jurors (seven of 12) found beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance existed. They further determined that the aggravating factors were not outweighed by any mitigating factors that would argue against the death penalty and recommended that the judge sentence Hurst to death. In a subsequent hearing, the judge held that the specified aggravating factors also outweighed factors in mitigation — in this case, Hurst's young age (he was 19), his limited prior criminal history and his poor mental functioning2 — in sentencing him to death.
Florida is unique among the 33 states that allow the death penalty in that it does not require capital sentencing juries to achieve unanimity in both finding beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors and recommending the death penalty. Also, a majority of Florida's jurors in a particular case do not need to find the same aggravating circumstance exists, they simply have to agree there is one that qualifies the defendant for the death penalty. Moreover, the jurors' eventual decision on the aggravating factor(s) and the imposition of the death penalty is also only advisory to the judge. Separate finding at a different hearing must be made by the sentencing judge for the death penalty to be imposed. The Supreme Court will decide whether Florida's unique procedures unfairly abridge the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury trial afforded by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution and whether these particular procedures might lead to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Psychological research has much to offer the court in its eventual decision. Considerable empirical research exists examining unanimity as a requirement for legal decision-making generally as well as specifically in regard to capital sentencing. A review of this research indicates that majority rather than unanimous jury decisions lead to briefer and less evidence-based determinations, less discussion of minority viewpoints and less satisfaction in eventual decisions of even the group members in the majority.3 As a consequence, Florida's procedures likely lead to less thoughtful deliberation of evidence and alternative viewpoints.
Yet, almost no research exists investigating several other relevant issues raised by Florida's capital sentencing scheme. For example, how does making a recommendation to a judge affect how motivated and invested jurors are in the capital decision-making process and in their findings of aggravating factors? And does the majority (as opposed to unanimity) rule further affect the length and quality of discussions and the jury's decisions? Also, does Florida's uniquely complicated role for jurors further confuse their deliberations when psychological research has already demonstrated that capital jurors have substantial difficulty understanding and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors in reaching their decisions?4 It will be interesting to see how much the court relies on the psychological research in its discussion of the constitutional issues at stake.
“Judicial Notebook” is a project of APA Div. 9 (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues).
