Juvenile crime and punishment

By Evvie Becker, PhD
University of Connecticut

The murder of 11-year-old Ryan Harris in Chicago this summer and the subsequent charging of two boys, ages 7 and 8, in her death have intensified debate over issues of juvenile law, with both a public and political push for harsher juvenile punishment and the right to try youths as adults.

The boys were accused in August of striking the Harris girl with a rock, sexually molesting her and suffocating her with her own underwear. But early in September, as doubts over their involvement grew, the charges were dropped.

Ironically, this high-profile case comes on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the founding of juvenile court?also in Chicago (1899). Social reformers who pushed for legislation founding the court asserted that youths were fundamentally different from adults and that rehabilitation was the raison d?être of juvenile justice. However, in recent decades these principles have eroded. In the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that juvenile courts must provide the same due process protections that adult courts ensure (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1967). Subsequent rulings have continued to alter the juvenile system, with youths increasingly tried as adults?most jurisdictions now may try 14-year-olds as adults.

As younger children are accused of violent crimes, the issue of competency has been raised in regard to a child?s capacity to understand proceedings. In the past, the very existence of a separate juvenile system suggested children were not considered competent by adult standards. Competency originated as a concept applied to an adult?s mental capacity to stand trial. Now, the issue of competency typically arises when an adult may be compromised by mental illness or developmental disabilities. The standard for determining competency was established in a 1960 Supreme Court ruling, Dusky v. United States (362 U.S. 402, 402, 1960) that said defendants must be able to understand the charges against them and be able to assist their attorneys in their defense. These stipulations apply to the capacity to waive the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney?the Miranda rights?as well as to the ability to participate in a trial.

In the Harris case, the issue of competency was briefly in question, although no one proposed the boys be tried as adults. In August, the prosecution questioned the boys? legal competency to stand trial, because of their age and immaturity. The defense fought the motion, claiming a ruling of incompetency would deny the opportunity to prove the boys? innocence. But Juvenile Court Judge Andrew Berman ordered a competency evaluation, which?had the case continued?would have been completed by October.

The largely unexplored area of age-related competency is a slippery slope, with essentially no legal precedent and limited research on the subject. Thus far, a few psychological studies have shown that children under the age of 14 generally lack the capacity to understand the legal process. (For example, they are unlikely to grasp the concept of a 'right.')

Without a strong, rehabilitation-oriented juvenile justice system, the question of what to do with youthful offenders declared incompetent remains unclear.

In the Harris case, the boys? waiver of their Miranda rights and their subsequent admissions to police?without any adult input into the decision to give up their rights?were also a concern. Had the boys been found competent to stand trial, and had the case continued, the issue of whether their statements were voluntary or coerced would likely have been pressed.

Newspaper accounts of police reports say the boys were initially questioned as witnesses, but when their stories failed to be consistent, they were questioned again, at the station, offering details police said only the assailants could have known.

Some advocates maintain that questioning a child in a police station is inherently coercive. In 1948, the murder conviction of a 15-year-old was reversed because the boy had confessed without friend or legal counsel present. Subsequent rulings led most states to develop safeguards for children during police interrogations, typically an 'interested adult' rule, requiring children to be allowed to speak with a parent or other friendly adult during the process.

For psychologists, this case and others like it suggest the need for professional input through research, legislative advocacy and participation in the legal process. Education of policy-makers, judicial representatives and the public about developmental distinctions that separate a child from an adult should be a high priority.

'Judicial notebook' is an effort by the Courtwatch Committee of APA?s Div. 9 (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues) to encourage involvement by psychologists in judicial decision-making.