Linguistic communication is among the most highly automatized forms of human behavior. Effortlessly and with stunning speed, speakers and hearers access and retrieve linguistic knowledge from memory and apply lower level and higher level cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, categorization, and inferencing while producing and comprehending utterances. For this to be possible, linguistic knowledge must be organized in maximally and immediately accessible and retrievable formats.

In the wake of Chomsky’s claim in the 1960s that language is a highly specialized and largely autonomous cognitive module, linguists and psychologists lost sight of the psychological foundations shared by language and nonlinguistic cognition. Although most linguists focused their attention on the description of linguistic structures and structural principles of language, most psychologists studied behavior and its cognitive and neuronal basis without worrying too much about the potential influence of language and its representations in the mind.

Over the past 20 years, this division of labor has begun to crumble. With the development of cognitive–linguistic, usage-based, and complex–adaptive models of language, linguistics has begun to emancipate itself from its self-imposed isolation and has found a foothold in the cognitive sciences alongside cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, social psychology, and other related fields. Many linguists have developed a keen interest in the role played by domain-general neurocognitive abilities and processes in the emergence and storage of linguistic knowledge. In contrast, many psychologists have not yet ventured far into linguistics, partly because what is still perceived as “mainstream” linguistics (i.e., Chomskyan autonomous linguistics) did not seem to offer much that would have made that effort worthwhile. Potential effects of the omnipresence of language and linguistic thought on human behavior, input processing, and learning are frequently not considered as falling within the remit of psychological inquiry.

The notion of entrenchment epitomizes like no other the opportunity to establish a new meeting ground for psychology and linguistics. It captures the idea that linguistic knowledge is not autonomous, abstract, and stative but is instead continuously refreshed and reorganized under the influence of communicative events in social situations. Linguistic entrenchment can essentially be regarded as a lifelong cognitive reorganization process, the course and quality of which are conditioned by exposure to and use of language on one hand and by the application of domain-general cognitive abilities and processes to language on the other. Memory, categorization, analogy, and abstraction, as well as perception and attention, are crucially
involved in entrenchment, as are routinization and automatization, and imitation and emulation.

The aim of the present volume is to bring together expertise from linguistics, psycholinguistics, neurology, and cognitive psychology to develop a joint vision of entrenchment, memory, and automaticity in linguistic and nonlinguistic cognition and to provide a realistic picture of the psychological and linguistic foundations of linguistic knowledge and language learning. The chapters collected could be of equal interest to linguists wishing to understand the psychology behind language and for psychologists who are willing to integrate linguistic aspects into their work. The notion of entrenchment mainly explains how linguistic knowledge emerges from language use and may therefore have a particularly strong appeal to supporters of usage-based theories of language. However, given its wide purview of linguistic perspectives and psychological processes, the present volume might serve as an incentive for linguists and psychologists of all persuasions to learn more about the ways in which linguistic knowledge is constantly reorganized and adapted.

The present book is divided into six parts. Part I (Setting the Scene) provides an expanded conceptualization of entrenchment, including its main facets and empirical evidence. Part II (Linguistic Perspectives on Entrenchment) begins with two chapters detailing the role of entrenchment in cognitive grammar (Chapter 2 by Ronald W. Langacker) and construction grammar (Chapter 3 by Martin Hilpert and Holger Diessel). The next three chapters look at entrenchment from the diachronic perspective (Hendrik De Smet, Chapter 4), the corpus-based perspective (Anatol Stefanowitsch and Susanne Flach, Chapter 5), and the experimental perspective (Alice Blumenthal-Dramé, Chapter 6). The final chapter in Part II proposes an understanding of entrenchment in terms of onomasiological salience (Dirk Geeraerts, Chapter 7).

In Part III (Cognitive Foundations of Linguistic Entrenchment Processes), the psychological perspective dominates. The six chapters assembled here deal with the psychological foundations of entrenchment. The first four deal with the key cognitive affordances behind entrenchment: memory (Atsuko Takashima and Iske Bakker, Chapter 8), automatization (Robert J. Hartsuiker and Agnes Moors, Chapter 9), statistical learning (Ethan Jost and Morten H. Christiansen, Chapter 10), and gestalt formation and chunking (Fernand Gobet, Chapter 11). The two remaining chapters discuss two major sets of psychological determinants of entrenchment processes: categorization, generalization, and analogy (Anne-Kristin Cordes, Chapter 12); and attention, perception, and salience (Franziska Günther, Hermann J. Müller, and Thomas Geyer, Chapter 13).

The three chapters in Part IV (Entrenchment in Language Learning and Language Attrition) investigate the role of entrenchment in first-language acquisition (Anna L. Theakston, Chapter 14), second-language learning (Brian MacWhinney, Chapter 15), and language attrition (Rasmus Steinkrauss and Monika S. Schmid, Chapter 16).
Part V (Deconstructing Entrenchment) consists of two chapters offering critical views of the notion of entrenchment and some of its premises and implications. One approaches entrenchment from the perspective of dynamic complexity theory (Philip Herdina, Chapter 17), the other from the perspective of radical embodiment cognitive science (Stephen J. Cowley, Chapter 18).

Finally, Part VI (Synopsis) synthesizes all the chapters by highlighting central insights and directions for future research.