Usually, when people recognize that a belief they hold is mistaken they try to correct it. But when it comes to superstitious beliefs, many people feel that they are "of two minds." Even those who claim not to be superstitious, for example, may be reluctant to utter the phrase "no-hitter" during the 8th inning of a baseball game or name their baby before he or she is born. How can people believe things that they know aren't true?
Traditionally, research on superstition has focused on people's cognitive shortcomings. But superstitions are not limited to individuals with cognitive deficits; there are many smart, educated, emotionally stable adults who have superstitions too. So why are superstitious beliefs pervasive and what can that tell us about the way that people think more broadly?
In a recent Psychological Review (2016) article (PDF, 263KB)opens in new window, Jane Risen makes two arguments.
First, she suggests that we can improve our understanding of superstition by considering the interaction between our "fast" and "slow" systems of thinking. Fast and slow, or "dual process models" of cognition, propose that one set of mental processes operates quickly and automatically to provide an initial intuitive judgment, while the other operates slowly and deliberately and is responsible for overriding intuitive judgments when it detects an error. A dual process account can help explain why superstitious thinking is widespread. It can also tell us why particular superstitions are formed and not others, and why superstitious beliefs are maintained even though they are not true.
Second, Risen suggests that to explain why superstitious beliefs are maintained even when people know they are not true, the existing model must be refined. People who hold superstitious beliefs and engage in actions that reflect those beliefs often realize — in the moment — that their thoughts and behaviors are irrational. Thus, the model must allow for the possibility that people can recognize that their intuitive judgment is wrong and believe it anyway.
Most models of judgment and decision making don't allow for this possibility — they assume that when an error is detected it will be corrected. Risen notes that this is not always the case. Sports fans wearing a lucky shirt in their living room, for example, may recognize that their shirt cannot affect play on the field and yet still feel more optimistic about the game when they wear it. Thus, she offers a modification to the model, explicitly separating error detection from error correction. With the modified model, sports fans can detect an error in their intuitive judgment, but fail to correct it nevertheless.
Although superstitious beliefs are often harmless, the argument for separating error detection and error correction applies beyond superstition. And, if people can benefit from correcting faulty beliefs, then it is important to recognize error detection and error correction as separate processes because fixing an error effectively depends on understanding where things are breaking down.
Sometimes the problem is not that people lack the information needed to recognize that they are making errors but that they are unable — or unwilling — to correct them.
Citation:
Risen, J. L. (2016). Believing what we do not believe: Acquiescence to superstitious beliefs and other powerful intuitions. Psychological Review, 123(2), 182–207. https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000017
Note: This article is in the Core of Psychology topic area. View more articles in the Core of Psychology topic area.