In a series of landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has excluded certain groups from being eligible for the death penalty. Some of these exclusions are based on the nature of the offense, while others are based on offenders' characteristics. For example, in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the court prohibited imposing the death penalty on offenders who are intellectually disabled. Subsequently, in Roper v. Simmons (2005), the court excluded offenders who were under age 18 at the time of the capital offense. These two decisions narrowed the class of offenders eligible for a death sentence to those who are considered most deserving of the justice system's ultimate penalty.
Cases in which offenders are excluded from the death penalty require pre-trial determinations about whether it is appropriate for the prosecution to seek the death penalty. Other cases call for post-trial or post-sentencing determinations about whether it is appropriate to carry out a death sentence. For example, in Ford v. Wainwright (1986) and Panetti v. Quarterman (2007), the Supreme Court held that prisoners must be competent to be executed.
An initiative in Indiana provides another basis for excluding offenders from the death penalty. Indiana Senate Bill 155, introduced in January, called for prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on defendants with serious mental illness as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Serious mental illnesses included in the bill are schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders; bipolar disorder; major depressive disorder; delusional disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; and traumatic brain injury. The bill excluded disorders manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct (such as antisocial personality disorder) or the acute effects of drugs or alcohol. Although the bill did not advance through the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee, it could serve as a blueprint for similar laws in other jurisdictions. This type of legislation is consistent with the views expressed by several major organizations, including APA. In 2006, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a resolution that opposes the use of the death penalty for individuals with severe mental illness. Soon after, APA, the American Psychiatric Association (ApA) and the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) adopted similar resolutions.
The exclusion in Senate Bill 155 reflects the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Atkins and Roper. The Supreme Court excluded juveniles (Roper) and individuals who are intellectually disabled (Atkins) from the death penalty because it recognized that those categories of offenders are less culpable than other offenders. Similarly, although Senate Bill 155 does not eliminate accountability, it recognizes that serious mental illness reduces an offender's culpability to the point where death would be a disproportionate punishment.
It has been over a decade since APA, ABA, ApA, and NAMI adopted resolutions opposing the use of the death penalty for individuals with severe mental illness. However, no death penalty jurisdiction has enacted a law preventing the execution of individuals with serious mental illness. Hopefully, Indiana's forward-thinking initiative will spur other states to consider similar legislation and limit the reach of the death penalty.
"Judicial Notebook" is a project of APA Div. 9 (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues).
