In 2012, Oklahoma oil rig worker Todd Beason lost his left arm when a construction crane fell on him at work. A jury awarded him $14 million, including $5 million in noneconomic damages for his mental anguish and pain and suffering. The trial judge reduced the $5 million to $350,000 because of an Oklahoma statute that limits noneconomic damages to no more than $350,000. In April, on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision, ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, as it “targets for different treatment less than the entire class of similarly situated persons who sue to recover for bodily injury” (Beason v. I.E. Miller Services, Inc., 2019).
The Beason case raises fundamental issues about caps on awards for noneconomic damage: Why do some jurisdictions use these caps, and should they be limiting compensation for plaintiffs’ primarily psychological injuries?
Historically, legal officials have been wary of emotional and mental distress claims, perceiving them as relatively minor and difficult to establish, and therefore ripe for malingering. In the 1980s and 1990s, noneconomic damage caps gained traction in the broader “tort reform” movement, in part due to high-profile cases such as the McDonald’s hot coffee case. This concern was also prominent in medical malpractice cases because of the fear that insurance companies would increase premiums and provide less coverage to patients to account for large payouts in civil lawsuits. Such caps were also intended to encourage plaintiffs to settle claims rather than seek big rewards at trial. These factors drove legislators in some jurisdictions to cap awards for noneconomic damages, often to specifically ensure that false and exaggerated psychological injury claims would not be erroneously or overly compensated.
But noneconomic damage caps rely on several flawed assumptions. For one, they presume that psychological injuries are less severe and credible—and therefore less worthy of compensation—than more “objective” bodily (physical) injuries. Yet research finds that psychological injuries can be just as severe as—or even more severe than—physical injuries. In one study, for example, Vallano and Dawn E. McQuiston, PhD, asked mock jurors to record the physical and psychological injuries they believed would typically result from various types of civil misconduct against plaintiffs. They found that participants rated psychological and physical injuries as similarly severe—even rating psychological injuries as more severe overall—and little evidence surfaced regarding lessened credibility for psychologically injured plaintiffs (Applied Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2018). Another flawed assumption behind such caps is that only psychological injuries can be feigned. However, some bodily injuries, such as soft tissue injuries, can be faked or exaggerated just as easily. And regardless, psychological tests can often ferret out malingering or exaggerated injury claims.
The Beason case reinvigorates a discussion on the rationale and efficacy of noneconomic damage award caps. Psycholegal research suggests that these caps may be unnecessary, as psychological and physical injuries may be more similar than different. In addition, noneconomic damage caps may unintentionally prohibit legitimately psychologically injured plaintiffs from receiving full compensation. More research is needed on these issues to assist courts when examining the efficacy of statutes that cap awards for noneconomic damage.
