Forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), the first in a series of cases to address juvenile sentencing jurisprudence for serious crimes under the Eighth Amendment. Eddings required lower courts to consider mitigating factors such as “the background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant in sentencing.” Since then, the court has demonstrated continued interest in scientific advances in child development and adolescent brain research, embracing the idea that children are different from adults for sentencing purposes. Thompson v. Oklahoma in 1988 invalidated executions of juveniles under 17 as unconstitutional, citing juveniles’ lesser culpability.
Roper v. Simmons in 2005 eliminated juvenile executions altogether, and Graham v. Florida in 2010 struck down life without parole for nonhomicides. Miller v. Alabama in 2012 denounced mandatory life without parole in juvenile homicide convictions. That decision relied on research demonstrating that juveniles are less culpable and have better potential for reform than adults. Montgomery v. Louisiana in 2016 went even further in stressing that the Miller language applied to past cases already decided, many of them years ago. Both Miller and Montgomery recognized the importance of these specific factors to address. This line of cases suggested that judges should apply a judicial “laser beam” in focusing on “irreparable corruption.”
However, Jones v. Mississippi (2021) is a troubling reversal from the court’s previous rulings that judges should address the issue of rehabilitation and the recognition in Miller that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” In Jones, the Supreme Court retreated from its evolution in understanding the importance of this developing research. Fifteen-year-old Brett Jones’s family and social history is like many juvenile homicide cases. There was a lengthy period of parental abuse and neglect, the effects of which can culminate in the commission of a terrible crime. The upholding of Jones’s life without parole sentence did not acknowledge precedent that has required judges to determine and make a record of whether a child falls in a protected class that is ineligible for life without parole.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s opinion confuses the legal landscape that had previously provided beneficial language to judges who must struggle with difficult decisions of who will remain in juvenile court for remediation and who will go to adult prison for one’s natural life. The Jones opinion in holding that “Miller and Montgomery do not require the sentencer to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing the defendant to life without parole” effectively “guts” established precedent, as opined in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent. She noted that under this break from precedent, “a sentencer never need determine, even implicitly, whether a juvenile convicted of homicide is one of ‘those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.’ Even if the juvenile’s crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, he can be sentenced to die in prison.” In effect, Jones now shields discretionary decision-making from scrutiny and does not require judges to focus on stated precepts from previous cases.
So, what to make of this muddying of the legal waters, and what are some proposed solutions? Many researchers have identified the inherent difficulties in deciding who fits into this rare group of “permanently incorrigible” adolescents. Legal scholars have proposed eliminating life without parole for juveniles and allowing for life with the possibility of parole as the maximum penalty. A juvenile who enters prison at age 17 could take hold of their destiny by establishing a history of positive behavior while incarcerated, demonstrating amenability to treatment, eventually making the case for parole, and walking out the prison gates.
