In November 2009, James Kahler shot and killed his estranged wife, Karen, their two teenage daughters and his estranged wife’s grandmother. The estranged spouses had been in the middle of a heated divorce, and the daughters had sided with their mother. While Kahler shot and killed the four females, he spared the life of their then 9-year-old son, who had wanted to stay with Kahler that weekend.
At trial, Kahler attempted to show that his severe depression precluded him from forming the intent and premeditation necessary to be convicted of murder. A 2009 Kansas statute says that mental disease or defect—such as Kahler’s depression—is a defense to prosecution only if "the defendant … lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged." As such, the Kansas statute narrows the question to whether Kahler could form the required intent, doing away with a separate insanity inquiry that examines whether he was able to distinguish right from wrong or control his actions.
In Kahler’s case, a defense expert testified that his depression undermined his judgment that night. But the prosecution expert opined that Kahler was intentional about what he was doing, citing the fact that Kahler did not harm his son. Under the Kansas statute, the jury was not asked to consider whether Kahler knew the difference between right and wrong and could control his conduct. Rather, the jurors were asked to consider only whether Kahler was able to form the requisite intent to kill. Determining that he did indeed form intent, Kahler was convicted of capital murder and the jury recommended the death sentence. Kahler appealed the decision, arguing that replacing the traditional insanity defense with the more restricted, mens rea approach of the Kansas statute, which focuses on the intention of wrongdoing, violated his due process rights. In 2018, the Kansas Supreme Court unanimously upheld Kahler’s conviction.
Kahler, in a recent brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, argues that a state cannot do away entirely with the insanity defense. He argues that the insanity defense—deeply ingrained in common law for hundreds of years—is fundamental to our legal tradition of protecting those who cannot tell the difference between right and wrong or cannot control their actions. In following an intent-only model, Kansas insists that it has not abolished the insanity defense. Rather, the state’s attorneys argue that it has taken advantage of the wide latitude that states have to consider how mental illness affects culpability for crimes.
In Clark v. Arizona (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court noted: "We have never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, nor have we held that the Constitution does not so require." While insanity defense standards and procedures have historically been open to state choice, the court is now being asked to decide whether a state can do away with the insanity defense.
In his article "Cruelty to the Mentally Ill: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to the Abolition of the Insanity Defense" (American University Law Review, 2007), Stephen LeBlanc argues that abolishing the insanity defense "exemplifies a dramatic departure from our common-law heritage and modern principles of humanity." It is impossible to know whether a jury would have judged Kahler’s depression to be so severe as to consider him insane on the night he murdered his family, but we may soon find out just how much latitude states have in setting—or abolishing—traditional insanity defense standards.
“Judicial Notebook” is a project of APA Div. 9 (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues).
